Acquisition research has traditionally been dominated by economic and atomistic assumptions. This study extends acquisition research by integrating behavioral learning and social network perspectives to examine the acquisitions of alliance partners. Specifically, we examine, at the dyadic level, how firms' alliance learning approaches (exploration versus exploitation) and their joint and relative embeddedness in alliance networks (joint brokerage positions and relative centrality) can interact to drive subsequent acquisitions of alliance partners. Our analyses of the U.S. computer industry support our theoretical framework, highlighting the unique and previously underexplored behavioral and relational drivers of acquisitions. 
of departure, our theoretical framework originates from firms' learning and network embeddedness in their strategic alliance networks, which are a more pertinent form of interfirm relationships that can influence subsequent acquisitions of partner firms.
ALLIANCE LEARNING, NETWORK EMBEDDEDNESS, AND ACQUISITIONS
Alliances and acquisitions are two important and distinctive means for firms to access external resources (Wang & Zajac, 2007) . A fundamental difference is that alliances only allow for partial control, while acquisitions afford complete ownership control of assets (Yin & Shanley, 2008) . They entail different flexibilities and risks: on the one hand, alliances allow piecemeal involvement and continuous reassessment of partners' contribution to a venture; on the other hand, acquisitions demand irreversible financial and managerial commitment from acquiring firms (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Mitsuhashi & Grece, 2009 ).
Despite their differences, alliances and acquisitions also share some commonalities. First, both are often used to access external resources. Second, they share some common motivations, such as synergy seeking. These overlapping functions indicate that alliances and acquisitions are closely related and that one activity may inform the other (Zollo & Reuer, 2010) .
The acquisition literature, however, has been developing largely in parallel with the alliance literature, with relatively little cross-fertilization occurring between the two (Yang, Lin, & Lin, 2010) . Although with different emphases and insights, prior theories have predominantly centered on economic rationality and atomistic assumptions, falling short of uncovering the behavioral and relational drivers of acquisitions (Levinthal & March, 1993; Lin et al., 2009 ). Rather than being atomistic players detached from their unique histories and broad contexts, firms are relational entities within alliance networks (Uzzi, 1996) . Consequently, firms' decisions to acquire alliance partners cannot be separated from either their past experiences or their embeddedness in the alliance relationships (Lin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011) .
We contend that a focus on firms' alliance learning and embeddedness in alliance networks may provide new insights into the conditions under which firms may acquire alliance partners. Specifically, we argue that firms are adaptive learning players. Owing to bounded rationality, firms often are not able to accurately assess the value of target firms. Prior interaction experience with potential targets in alliances offers valuable information on the valuation of targets. We further point out that the value of learning experiences varies with certain alliance contexts.
Although there are many ways to "dimensionalize" alliance learning, March's (1991) influential exploitation-exploration framework represents an insightful way to deal with alliance heterogeneity. Since Koza and Lewin's (1998) extension of March's (1991) In addition to alliance learning, it has long been argued that acquisitions do not take place in a vacuum, but are embedded in a broader social and economic context (Haunschild, 1993 We propose that it is important to integrate the behavioral learning perspective and the social network perspective when predicting acquisitions of alliance partners. Although learning through alliances increases firms' awareness of partners' value in tacit resources and capabilities, such learning takes place in alliance networks and so is subject to network embeddedness. We further argue that the actual occurrence of partner acquisitions is contingent on firms' motivation and capability, which are facilitated by how the dyadic relationship between a firm and its partner is embedded in an alliance network. Specifically, we focus on (1) joint brokerage positions and (2) relative centrality, two of the most relevant embeddedness constructs for the study of alliance networks (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) . Joint brokerage positions refer to the collective network openness (opportunity for brokerage) enjoyed by two firms in an alliance as a whole, and relative centrality denotes the asymmetry in network positions between two alliance partner firms. Joint brokerage position captures the total amount of nonredundant information accessed by an alliance, and relative centrality reflects the degree of distal information search and power dynamics within an alliance. We argue that joint brokerage positions, when coupled with exploration alliances, may increase alliance value and thus firms' motivation to acquire alliance partners. Further, relative centrality may not only help firms in exploration alliances to enhance their ability to access distal information, but also facilitate power imbalance that may lead to the acquisition of partner firms. As most acquisitions are a result of dyadic interactions between two firms, we take a dyadic approach rather than the focal firm approach used by some prior studies (Palmer et al., 1995) . These two relational constructs are thus not only representative of key ideas in network research, but also speak directly to the relevance of dyadic interactions between firms in an alliance for subsequent acquisitions.
It 
Effects of Alliance Learning
Firms' expectations and objectives are often shaped by their experiences, which is also true in the case of partner acquisitions. For two reasons, we argue that, compared with exploitation alli-ances, exploration alliances are more likely to result in acquisitions of alliance partners. First, exploration alliances provide more relevant foundations for firm risk taking and also better chances for firms to understand partner firms' resources, increasing their awareness of the true value of partner firms. Exploration alliances are designed for knowledge search and creation that extends beyond firms' own knowledge bases. The joint knowledge and capability building in exploration alliances require close interaction that exposes firms to partners' tangible and intangible knowledge. On the contrary, exploitation alliances are mainly used for maximizing the value of existing resources (Levinthal & March, 1993) . They have less need for intensive interaction on knowledge creation and transfer (Hansen et al., 2001) . For instance, the interaction between alliance firms is much less in a licensing alliance (a form of exploitation alliance) than it is in an R&D alliance (a form of exploration alliance). Thus, compared with exploitation alliances, exploration alliances may enable a better understanding of partners' value as potential targets.
Second, because they involve active search for knowledge and technology, exploration alliances are more dynamic and generate more opportunities for future expansion that can be facilitated by the acquisition of alliance partners. In comparison, exploitation alliances are more stable and focus on maintaining the status quo. In exploration alliances, managers constantly struggle to define responsibilities and benefits of partners, because uncertainty and ambiguity are high (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). However, in exploitation alliances, it is relatively easier for managers to define responsibilities and benefits, as the use of existing knowledge and resources entails much less ambiguity (McGrath, 2001 ). Thus, the stable nature of exploitation alliances may make them less useful for deferred acquisitions (Dussauge et al., 2000) . If firms sought to acquire others that are their partners in exploitation alliances, they would be more likely to have done so before they formed the exploitation alliances in the first place. On the contrary, the dynamic and uncertain nature of exploration alliances makes it necessary for firms to understand partners first before initiating acquisition (Kogut, 1991 (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988) . Of the two competing views on the value of network openness, the first one suggests that a closed network-a network of densely interconnected contacts-fosters cohesive ties among network members. Such network closure is expected to not only help the transfer of fine-grained information, but also promote trust, a form of social capital that enhances the development of norms for acceptable behavior and the diffusion of complex information (Coleman, 1988) . A second view, on the contrary, is that a closed network is also laden with repetitive and redundant information that may constrain a firm's innovative behaviors. Alternatively, it proposes a different form of social capital that resides in the brokerage opportunities created by the openness (i.e., lack of connection between separate clusters) in a social network (Burt, 1992) . It is expected that firms in brokerage positions have the potential to access a broad array of distinct information and referrals that help them anticipate and explore new opportunities (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) . In this article, we focus on the joint brokerage positions occupied by two firms in an alliance as a whole because the value of an alliance is determined by the pooled contribution of both partners in terms of resources and information.
We argue that when two alliance partners have a high degree of joint brokerage, the access to new and diverse channels through structural holes (disconnections between nonredundant contacts in a network) may provide increasing value for exploration alliances, which thrive on breadth and openness (March, 1991). However, with the increasing value of exploration alliances in an open network, firms may also face constant renegotiation about the property rights for newly generated technologies that are hard to specify in the beginning of exploration alliances (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Such a dynamic process may further propel firms to acquire alliance partners in two ways. First, the increased value of exploration alliances can alleviate firms' qualms about the true value of partner firms and increase their confidence and motivation regarding internalizing the alliance activities through acquisition (Baum & Ingram, 2003) . Second, interpartner conflicts may provide more incentives to initiate acquisition of partner firms, which can resolve these conflicts and also yield more benefits through internalization and hierarchical control (Dussauge et al., 2000) . Consequently, with the support of structural hole positions, exploration alliances may become a more rewarding and less risky way for firms to increase their financial commitment and undertake acquisitions of alliance partners (Folta & Miller, 2002) .
Conversely, when there is a low degree of joint brokerage, firms tend to be more constrained in their information search, which will primarily be in local and familiar domains. Redundant information flow among network members may undermine the creative activities required by exploration alliances. Because of such a mismatch, these exploration alliances will be unlikely to generate favorable outcomes, and the partners to them may also be less likely to become attractive targets for potential acquisitions. We thus predict that joint brokerage positions strengthen the positive link between exploration alliances and partner acquisitions. Data on alliances and acquisitions were collected from the SDC Platinum database and verified using LexisNexis and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service. Financial data were retrieved from Compustat, and patent data were collected from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Overall, we identified 2,852 within-industry alliances announced from 1990 to 1996 (inclusive), involving 1,453 firms. Among them we located 62 focal firms with relatively complete financial information in Compustat and further identified their respective ego networks (an ego network consists of the relationships between a focal firm and its direct partners and the relationships among those direct partners) within the overall industry alliance network. Because SDC does not reveal the termination dates of alliances, and the lifespan of an alliance is usually no more than five years (Kogut, 1988), we used a five-year moving window to capture the cumulative nature of a firm's alliance portfolio. We also did this to capture a firm's network embeddedness-for example, a five-year moving window of the alliance network for 1996 is based on all the newly announced alliances from 1992 to 1996. Consequently, we further collected alliance data from 1986 to 1989, involving an additional 111 alliances. We constructed the symmetric (nondirectional) matrix (1,453 ϫ 1,453) for each year using Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002).
Dependent Variable: Acquisitions of Alliance Partners
Our focus is examining whether alliances evolve into acquisitions of alliance partners because of firms' alliance learning and network embeddedness. Thus, we coded our dependent variable as a dummy (1 ϭ "partner acquisition," 0 ϭ "no partner acquisition").
Independent Variables
Exploration alliance index. To construct an exploration alliance index, we analyzed the nature of alliance learning in each alliance. Prior research suggested that alliances involving upstream activities such as R&D that may lead to innovative technologies and applications can be conceptualized as having exploration purposes, whereas alliances involving downstream activities such as the commercialization and utilization of existing technologies are mainly for exploitation (Lin et al., 2009 ). Therefore, we content-analyzed the description of each alliance (e.g., marketing alliance, licensing alliance) provided in the SDC database. Specifically, we coded those alliances that focused on the discovery and development of new technology as exploration alliances and coded those that focused on marketing and resource utilization as exploitation alliances. For example, as described in SDC Platinum, IBM and Insoft set up an alliance in 1993 to Joint brokerage positions. The standard way to calculate brokerage position is to rely on Burt's (1992) constraint measure of structural holes, which taps the extent to which a firm's ego network is directly or indirectly concentrated in a single contact. If a firm's alliance partners all have one another as partners, then that firm is highly constrained. A network concentrated in one contact means fewer structural holes. To measure the joint brokerage positions occupied by two firms in an alliance, however, we could not simply sum up their constraint scores, because doing so might neglect the potential network overlap between them. Therefore, for each alliance event we recompiled the network matrices by treating the alliance as a node with two partner firms and used Ucinet 6 to compute the constraint score for this alliance node as the value of joint brokerage positions. Following Soda, Usai, and Zaheer (2004), we multiplied the value of constraint by Ϫ1 to capture structural holes (the "opposite" of constraint).
Relative centrality. We first calculated the degree centrality of each firm in the alliances based on the above ego alliance network. We then divided the focal firm's degree centrality by its partner firm's degree centrality to compute the value of relative centrality. A high value indicates that a focal firm has a higher centrality score than its partner firm.
Control Variables
Equity alliance index. Relative to nonequity alliances, equity alliances may allow a deeper understanding of partner capabilities that may affect subsequent acquisition decisions (Folta & Miller , 2002;  Tong et al., 2008) . We therefore controlled for equity alliance index (1 ϭ "equity alliance," 0 ϭ "nonequity alliance").
Strategic interdependence. Interdependence among partner firms may affect how one acquires another. Following Gulati (1995) and Rothaermel and Boeker (2008), we used a count of each dyad's nonoverlapping technological niches as a proxy for its strategic interdependence. We first mapped out each firm's patent distribution in the six broad technological categories defined by NBER and then calculated the absolute number of nonoverlapping technological niches between each dyad as a measure of strategic interdependence.
Asymmetry in firm size. If two firms are of equal size, it is difficult for one to acquire the other. We thus divided each focal firm's number of employees by the partner firm's number of employees to compute the asymmetry in firm size.
Combined financial resources. We controlled for the sum of cash held by alliance partner firms before an acquisition, as most acquisitions still rely on cash transactions (Hitt et al., 2001) .
Competitor alliance index. If two competing firms form an alliance, there is a high probability that one of them will acquire the other to reduce competition (Yang et al., 2010) . We thus created a control variable by comparing alliance partners' business segments as defined by SIC codes. If both firms operated in either the hardware or software sector, we coded competitor alliance index as 1. Otherwise, it was coded as 0.
In addition, we also controlled for industry concentration, measured by the four-firm concentration ratio using data from the U.S. Census Bureau. As these data are only available every five years, we linearly extrapolated the available concentration ratios over missing periods. We also included year dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Analysis
Since the dependent variable was dichotomous, we ran logistic regression analyses. The presence of multiple observations for a dyad over several years raised the concern of potential interdependence. To address this, we used random-effects logistic models. We also lagged all the independent and control variables by one year in regression and conducted our analyses using the "xtlogit" command in Stata V.10. In other words, if firm A formed five alliances in 1990, it might take some time for firm A to interact with others before initiating acquisitions. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, and Table 2 displays random-effects logistic regression models. Following Aiken and West (1991), we mean-centered the predictor variables before generating interaction terms. To assess the potential threat of collinearity, we estimated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and found that no variable had a VIF greater than 2.38, which is below the recommended ceiling of 10. We also used the "coldiag" procedure in Stata to conduct the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) multicollinearity diagnostic test, which shows that the condition number for our complete model is 7.62, well below the threshold of 30. For the random-effects logistic regression models, we first ran the base model with controls only. We then added the predictor variables in model 2 and interaction terms in model 3. Model 1 shows that there is a significant relationship between competitor alliance index and partner acquisition, suggesting that competing firms are likely to acquire alliance partners. In Hypothesis 1, we argue that a firm's exploration alliance index is positively associated with its subsequent acquisitions of alliance partners. The coefficient for exploration alliance index is significant at the .05 level in model 2 and at the .01 level in model 3, supporting our Hypothesis 1. Our Hypothesis 2 argues that joint brokerage positions occupied by alliance firms strengthen the relationship between exploration alliance learning and subsequent acquisitions of alliance partners. The interaction coefficient between joint brokerage positions and exploration alliance index is positive and significant (p Ͻ .05), supporting Hypothesis 2. Further, the interaction between the exploration alliance index and relative centrality is positively significant (p Ͻ .05), supporting Hypothesis 3. Figure 1 shows the interaction plots, which are consistent with our predictions. For instance, Panel A illustrates that firms are likely to undertake partner acquisitions when alliance firms share a high degree of joint brokerage.
FINDINGS
To gain additional insights, we also conducted a separate robustness analysis to examine the performance consequences of a firm's partner acquisitions by regressing a firm's average return on equity (ROE) during the two years following an acquisition of alliance partners. Our findings show that a firm's partner acquisition is positively related to its performance at a significant level (p Ͻ .05).
DISCUSSION

Contributions
In our view, at least three contributions emerge. First, this study contributes to acquisition research by offering a different explanation, one based on behavioral and relational perspectives that are critical but often underexplored in prior studies. Specifically, we find that firms are behavioral in nature: firms' acquisitions of alliance partners are often informed by the firms' alliance learning approaches. The finding on the role of exploration alliances speaks to the importance of examining the learning nature of alliances if one endeavors to probe the link between alliances and acquisitions. Our study further suggests that firms are relational entities and embedded in interfirm relationships. The nature of alliance learning, when matched Second, this study takes one step forward in bridging two separate streams of research on alliances and on acquisitions. How firms' learning in alliances and the network attributes of alliance relationships drive acquisitions of alliance partners has rarely been examined. This study is thus among the first to leverage the learning spillover argument (Zollo & Reuer, 2010) and suggest that alliance learning affects partner acquisitions in unique ways. Our focus on alliance networks also represents significant progress above and beyond the few previous studies on the link between social networks and acquisitions, which have almost exclusively focused on interlocking directorates (Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et al., 1995) .
Finally, this study extends prior social network research by addressing both alliance attributes and network characteristics. Although Granovetter (1985) 
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Our results need to be interpreted in light of limitations. In striving for accuracy and simplicity, we only studied one industry in one country, and results should be understood in the context of the U.S. computer industry. Future research can extend this study to other industries and countries to examine the generalizability of our findings. Since we followed prior research to limit the boundaries of our alliance network to be within the computer industry (Rowley et al., 2000), we were thus unable to investigate the impact of cross-industry alliances on acquisitions.
There are several additional avenues for future research. First, to extend our focus on acquisitions of alliance partners, future research could further investigate acquisitions of both partner and nonpartner firms in an industry network. Second, our sample firms are computer firms in the United States, an institutional environment quite different from that in emerging economies such as China 
Conclusion
Although acquisitions have received significant attention, what is not well known is how behavioral and relational factors drive acquisitions of alliance partners. As an initial step in this direction, this article offers an integrative perspective on partner acquisitions and demonstrates that learning approaches and network embeddedness, as embodied in alliance networks, significantly affect acquisitions of partner firms. Firms that approach acquisitions and alliances separately often fail to leverage the learning derived from these sets of related activities and are now increasingly advised to establish a combined "acquisitions and alliances" function (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2004). Likewise, scholars interested in acquisitions, alliances, and learning may need to more closely integrate research in these areas. In conclusion, if this article can communicate only one message, we would suggest that bridging the learning and network perspectives appears to be a fruitful and promising avenue for advancing research on the intriguing phenomena of acquisitions, alliances, and learning.
